Transfer of Knowledge and Technology to ERTI

Introduction

The transformation of ERTI into a world-class organization relied heavily on adopting the latest advancements in educational technology from abroad and adapting them to the cultural norms of Iran. A straightforward approach to achieving this was by inviting American instructors to train the staff. However, these efforts unfolded during the height of the Cold War, complicating what might have otherwise been a purely academic endeavor. From the critics’ perspective, this project took on political dimensions, as Iran in the 1970s was one of the key battlegrounds in the ongoing rivalry between Russia and the United States. This geopolitical tension significantly influenced how government organizations like ERTI could transfer technology, especially from the United States.

The discord between Russia and the West in Iran was not merely a product of the Cold War—it had deeper historical roots. Dating back to the 19th century (Lenczowski, 1968), this tension continues to manifest in various forms even in the post-Cold War era. In the 1850s, Russia sought to extend its influence toward the Persian Gulf, threatening British colonial possessions in India and Egypt. In response, Britain used Iranian territory as a buffer to protect its interests from Russian encroachment. Both powers repeatedly violated Iran’s sovereignty, undermining its central government and weakening its institutions.

Continued East-West Rivalry in the Twentieth Century

During World War I, despite Iran’s declaration of neutrality, Russia and Britain—this time as allies within the Triple Entente—disregarded this stance and divided the country into two spheres of influence. Their actions caused severe economic and social distress for the Iranian people. The presence of foreign troops led to widespread famine and disease, resulting in a significant loss of life, with Iran losing nearly half of its population by 1918 (Majd, 2013).

In 1941, Anglo-Russian forces once again violated Iran’s neutrality, occupying the country under the pretext of wartime alliance. To be sure, the American army had a major presence in Iran as well. However, it did not have a combat role. The American armed forces were there to transport lend-lease war material from the ports of the Persian Gulf in the southern shores of Iran to its northern border with the Soviet Union.

The British, however, forced the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi, leading to political instability. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union exploited the political turmoil to transform Iran into a Soviet colony (Bouscaren, 1952)Russia’s primary instrument in this effort was the Tudeh Communist Party, founded in 1941. The party built an influential network of members, including high-ranking police and military officers, as well as industrial workers, particularly in the oil sector.

In addition to its political efforts, the Soviet Union also sought to influence Iran’s educated class and intellectual elite through the Soviet Iranian Society for Cultural Relations. This society, a branch of the Russian cultural organization VOKS, or the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, worked to promote Soviet ideology through cultural means. It established “Cultural Centers” across Iran, featuring libraries, lectures, concerts, art exhibitions, and theatrical performances. These centers became gathering places for many young Iranian intellectuals (Bouscaren, 1952, p. 271). Under the influence of the Tudeh Party and Soviet sponsored cultural organizations, many Iranian intellectuals began promoting communist ideals through newspapers, books, speeches, and artistic media, such as poetry, films, and stage plays. By the 1950s, Soviet efforts had significantly shaped the mindset of Iran’s intelligentsia and educated youth. For many, being a conscientious intellectual meant aligning with communist ideals and opposing the Iranian government and its constitutional parliamentarian monarchy.

After World War II, despite the agreement reached between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at the Tehran Conference in 1943, the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its forces from Iran. Moreover, it actively supported communist separatist movements, particularly in the northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan and among Kurdish tribes in the west. The Soviet defiance in remaining in Iran led to the first issue ever addressed by the newly formed United Nations Security Council.

Iranian diplomacy, with backing from Britain and the United States, ultimately succeeded in expelling Soviet forces. However, this outcome did not come about without the West pursuing its own interests. British influence persisted in Iran, primarily to protect its oil interests in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), while the U.S. gained strategic leverage against the Soviet Union by positioning itself along Iran’s lengthy border with Russia (Amanat, 2017; Brown, 1951; Deutschmann, 2016).

Recognizing the rapid spread of communism worldwide, U.S. President Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) aimed to contain it across Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas, particularly in nations with underdeveloped economies. In his second inaugural address on January 20, 1949, President Truman outlined the framework for U.S. postwar foreign policy, centered on four key points:

1. Supporting the United Nations,
2. Assisting in the postwar recovery of the global economy,
3. Strengthening “freedom-loving” nations against the threat of aggression, and
4. Offering scientific knowledge and technical aid to developing countries to improve the lives of their people (Truman, 1949)

To implement the fourth point of President Truman’s speech, the U.S. Department of State established the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA). Known locally in Iran as “Point 4” (asl-e-chahar), the TCA’s program focused primarily on assisting rural populations in improving agricultural, healthcare, and educational practices Thus, the postwar transfer of knowledge from the United States to Iran emerged within the broader context of the Cold War  (McFarland, 1980; Warne, 1999; Westad, 2017).

Another key factor intensifying East-West rivalry in mid-20th century Iran was British control of the country’s oil wealth. In the early 1950s, as Point 4 projects in Iran were thriving, Tudeh Party deputies in the Majlis pressured the government, led by the very popular Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh (1882-1967), to offer the Soviet Union the same kind of oil concession that Britain enjoyed in Iran. This demand escalated the East-West rivalry, triggering a major political and economic crisis.

Despite these pressures, Dr. Mossadegh pursued a policy of national independence and self-determination, refusing to grant oil concessions to the Soviet Union, but also demanding nationalization of Iran’s oil industry. He became a champion of anti-colonialist sentiments, which were widespread in the 1950s among developing nations. Although Iran was never a colony, Dr. Mossadegh successfully redirected Iranians’ deep-seated animosity toward British control of oil through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). He called for the transfer of AIOC operations to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

The educated class, representing a wide spectrum of political beliefs and affiliations, overwhelmingly supported Dr. Mossadegh’s policy of dissolving AIOC and transferring the management of the oil industry to NIOC. Through a series of political and parliamentary maneuvers, Mossadegh successfully secured the Majlis deputies’ vote to nationalize Iran’s oil resources. Following this decision, he expelled the British managers overseeing the oil industry. While this move garnered widespread popular support, it also halted oil exports, severely reducing government revenues needed to pay government employees and manage its daily affairs.

Additionally, Iran quickly exhausted its foreign exchange reserves, making it impossible to import essential goods, such as sugar, which people relied on. Political unrest followed, with demonstrations and clashes between various factions taking over the streets of Tehran. British intelligence agents further fueled these tensions, helping to keep the demonstrations, many involving members of the Tudeh Party, active not only in Tehran but in Shiraz and other major cities as well. The prominent involvement of the Tudeh Party in these protests heightened public fears that communists, acting on behalf of the Soviet Union, were poised to seize power in Tehran and annex Iran to Russia as “Iranistan.”

In response to the escalating crisis, Dr. Mossadegh took several extraconstitutional steps. He dissolved the Majlis and declared himself the commander-in-chief of the armed forces—a role constitutionally reserved for the monarch. These actions amounted to a coup d’état, though led by a sitting prime minister who had been duly appointed by the Shah and legally voted into office by the Majlis (Mokhtari, 2008). With his constitutional powers in question, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left the country in protest.

With the Majlis dissolved and the monarch in exile, Iran’s political system descended further into chaos. Street clashes in Tehran intensified, involving forces loyal to the constitution, members of the Tudeh Party, and far-right political agitators. To further complicate the situation, Kermit Roosevelt, a CIA operative, entered the fray. While his actions had little essential impact, leftist and communist Iranians continue to refer to the 1953 events as a CIA-engineered coup d’état. Roosevelt himself, however, never made such a claim, instead describing his involvement as a “counter-coup” at best (Roosevelt, 1979).

In the end, a retired military general, designated by the Shah to replace Dr. Mossadegh, led a national uprising. Active-duty military officers loyal to the constitution joined him, helping to stabilize the situation. The Shah returned, and for a time, communist agitation subsided. However, the involvement of British and American intelligence services in the events of 1953 gave communists, the clergy, and their sympathizers a reason to question the legitimacy of Iran’s constitutional monarchy, viewing it as subservient to Western interests.

This distrust provided radical clergy and their communist allies with the justification to rise again in 1963, protesting the Shah’s land reform, the integration of women into public life, the expansion of educational services, the industrialization of manufacturing, and the mechanization of agriculture. They criticized these policies as imperialist schemes designed to impose Western values on Iran and detach Iranians from their traditional cultural heritage and national identity. From 1963 through the 1970s, new communist, Maoist, and radical violent clerical groups engaged in violent resistance to thwart the Shah’s social reforms and economic revival efforts. Eventually, in 1979, their revolutionary fervor led to the destruction of Iran’s constitutional parliamentary monarchy and its replacement by an absolute Islamic dictatorship, which remains in power today.

Amid the political violence of the 1970s, Iran, like many countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, sought to continue transferring scientific and technological advancements from more developed nations to accelerate its economic development projects. During this period, the People’s Republic of China, the largest nation in Asia, was actively formulating strategies to transfer technology from the West. Ironically, however, Iranian Maoists and Islamic Marxists vehemently protested the transfer of technology from Western countries to Iran.

A Day at Beijing University

On a delightful sunny day in early September of 1975, officials from China’s Ministry of Radio and Television welcomed members of a visiting NIRT delegation for a tour of Beijing University. During this visit, which included this author, NIRT delegates participated in several meetings with the university’s faculty and administrators. These discussions provided the visiting Iranians with a firsthand understanding of the emerging changes in China.

A particularly revealing conversation took place with the faculty of economics. Though the dialogue was slow due to the need for interpretation, the NIRT representatives learned that China was gradually turning toward the West to embrace foreign investment, adopt cutting-edge manufacturing technologies, and implement certain aspects of a market economy. While the full impact of these groundbreaking decisions would not be visible until the 1990s, the NIRT delegates could already sense the transformative shifts on the horizon.

Later in the day, the delegation toured the university library, where they were taken to the English collection. What caught their attention were textbooks from prominent U.S. publishers, primarily dating back to the early 1950s, with no more recent additions. It was evident that the university had ceased acquiring American publications for over 20 years. However, a conversation with the university librarian revealed that she was preparing to restock the library shelves with current books authored by American and European academics.

Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries in the 1970s

From the 1970s onward, communist China emerged as a leading example among developing countries in transferring technology from capitalist nations (Conroy, 1985; Daniels, Krug, & Nigh, 1985; Phillips, 1985; Shi, 1985; Wen, 2000). By the dawn of the 21st century, China rivaled Western Europe in manufacturing and became the largest economy in the world, following only the United States (Leith, 2006; Mittal, Gao, & Shah, 2015; Muhlhahn, 2019; Prasad, January 10, 2016 Sunday).

South Korea also exemplified successful technology transfer during this period, importing automotive and electronic manufacturing technologies, and eventually establishing itself as a major exporter of cars and electronics. Additionally, India developed its national capabilities across various sectors, including pharmaceuticals, information technology, and space exploration, leveraging technology transfers from both Western sources and Russia.

By adopting new technological innovations and advanced knowledge, these countries significantly elevated the income of a notable segment of their populations in a relatively short time. Smaller Asian nations, such as Taiwan, as well as former colonies like Hong Kong and Singapore, also experienced rapid economic development through the adoption of Western technologies. By the turn of the 21st century, these nations joined the ranks of economically developed countries, characterized by high-income levels among their populations (Friedman, 2005).

Sources of Technology During the Cold War

In the 1960s and 1970s, many development projects in Iran required importing foreign technologies. Those responsible for these economic initiatives based their decisions on the structures of First and Second World economies. Western First World nations, with their advanced economies, had both heavy and light industries as well as process technologies like management and training systems that contributed to their success. Their open market systems and supportive government policies facilitated the transfer of knowledge and technology to developing nations, as long as national security was not at risk. In contrast, the Second World, led by the Soviet Union, operated under a centralized, command-and-control economy. This model supported heavy industry but hindered the development of light manufacturing and process technologies. Additionally, the Soviet block of countries existed behind an Iron Curtain that impeded normal commerce and the exchange of ideas and technologies with the outside world. For developing countries like Iran, the pragmatic approach during the Cold War was to look to the Soviet Union for heavy manufacturing while importing light industries and process technologies from the West. This strategy also served to balance Soviet influence with that of the West in the polarized global atmosphere.

However, members of the countercultural movements, communists, and the clergy in Iran viewed technology transfer from the West through the ideological lens of the Cold War. For them, it was an axiom that technology transfer from Western First World nations fostered dependency, particularly when the donor country had an open market economy and liberal democratic governance. Yet, this critique was selectively applied. When Iran acquired steel production technology from the Soviet Union in 1971 in exchange for natural gas, these critics remained silent, not invoking the dependency theory.[1] Conversely, they strongly condemned the transfer of industrial and agricultural technologies from the West, aligning their objections with dependency theory.

Transfer of Technology and Dependency Theory

In the polarized political climate of the 1970s Cold War, ERTI leaders had to justify the transfer of educational technology from the United States to Iran to leftist critics and the literary elite. Both groups held influential positions in the government and could obstruct the progress of new organizations like ERTI. The literary elite, generally unfamiliar with technology—especially communication and education systems—harbored a fear of the unknown. They worried that the infusion of technology would disfigure the aesthetic appeal of Iran’s cultural heritage.

To address these concerns this author presented the rationale for adopting educational technology in radio and television programs that were directed to general audience in prime time. ERTI staff also invited high profile members of the literary elite to visit ERTI and review their educational programs firsthand. Soon these skeptics realized that communication media, combined with a systems approach to education, could provide valuable opportunities for students and teachers to engage with Iran’s cultural legacy. After witnessing the creative work of ERTI, even if they didn’t fully embrace educational technology, their hostility diminished. This shift became apparent in their contributions to NIRT policy-setting and decision-making sessions, where they had a strong presence. Their more moderate views likely influenced other high-level government discussions where they also held significant sway.

Counter-culturalists and communists, on the other hand, viewed reality through an ideological lens. Their beliefs were rooted in a key tenet of dependency theory, which posits that technology transfer is a one-way process from wealthier countries to poorer ones, designed to make the latter financially, technologically, and ideologically dependent on the former. Convincing them of the benefits of technology transfer, especially from the United States, was extremely difficult, if not impossible. They feared that accepting capital and technology from Western institutions would lead to Iran becoming dependent on foreign powers, thereby compromising its freedom and sovereignty (Alavi & Shanin, 1982; So, 1990). This ideological blind spot prevented them from recognizing that the goal of technology transfer to ERTI was not to create dependency on American advisors or the universities they represented. On the contrary, the aim was to foster an independent and self-reliant staff. ERTI only selected and implemented technologies that aligned with its mission to train a world-class, effective workforce

Emergence of the Post-Industrial Age

The leaders of NIRT approached technology transfer with pragmatism and optimism. They believed that such projects were not inherently unfair, nor did they have an unavoidable tendency to disadvantage receiving organizations. While some poorly planned and executed projects did indeed harm the recipients, the real challenge for leaders in developing countries was to design initiatives that benefited both donors and receivers alike. In the transformative decade of the 1970s, NIRT/ERTI leaders were well positioned to leverage a historic shift in the global economy that reinforced their positive outlook.

In his remarkable book, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Daniel Bell (1973) argued that the world was transitioning from an industrial to a post-industrial era. In this new epoch, service sector institutions, such as education, would become the primary drivers of wealth creation. Bell envisioned that in educational organizations, donors and receivers of technology could engage in mutually beneficial exchanges and collaborate on research and development projects. Over time, such cooperation could potentially strengthen both parties to the point where the distinction between both the donor and the receiver organizations would become indistinguishable (Schumpeter, 2017).

However, this was not a guaranteed outcome of the post-industrial economy. Successful technology transfers, particularly of process technologies like educational technology, needed to be designed with the interests of both the donor and receiver in mind. These projects had to be managed collaboratively, ensuring equal participation and a reciprocal exchange of information. ERTI’s training program exemplified this approach, becoming one of the early instances of post-industrial technology transfer to a developing country, with a focus on partnership and mutual benefit.

ERTI Model of Technology Transfer

ERTI management developed a seven-step model for technology transfer. The first three steps involved screening, selecting, and adopting new technology. The next four steps focused on adapting the technology to meet organizational needs, successfully implementing it, assessing the results, and sharing those outcomes with the donor and other relevant professionals. Figure 9.1 below illustrates this model.

Screening Technologies

To implement its technology transfer model, NIRT/ERTI carefully screened donor organizations and selected only projects that aligned with its mission and vision. The aim was to enhance ERTI’s institutional capacity to meet the needs of the MOE and its other clients. Three key areas of immediate need guided the screening and selection process:

1. Training ERTI staff to apply state-of-the-art educational technology concepts to produce radio and television programs and conduct in-person training workshops.
2. Short term planning to manage current ERTI operations while long-term strategies were being developed.
3. Overseeing the long-term planning and development of ERTI.

In the 1970s, numerous international development agencies, universities, private companies, and consulting firms from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and other advanced nations actively engaged in technology transfer to Iran. Representatives from these organizations frequently approached ERTI with project proposals. For instance, Children’s Television Workshop, the producer of Sesame Street in New York, proposed creating an Iranian version of the show. A dairy processing firm from California suggested producing a series of bilingual television programs, while a French company proposed making ERTI’s programs interactive.

Despite careful consideration, ERTI leaders ultimately rejected all three proposals, as well as many others, as they did not align with the organization’s core objectives. The idea of creating an Iranian version of Sesame Street with characters based on the country’s rich folkloric and classical literature was intriguing, but the proposal lacked essential components such as organizational and human resource capacity building. Furthermore, producing children’s content outside the MOE curriculum fell under the domain of NIRT’s Network One, Children’s Group, managed by Mr. Mohammad Naficy. This unit was already producing innovative children’s programs using techniques like puppeteering and animation, similar to those of Sesame Street. As a result, the Children’s Group was better positioned to undertake such a project. In the case of the dairy company from Oakland, California, ERTI found it puzzling that a dairy firm was venturing into bilingual television production. ERTI informed the company that, as a national network, it broadcasted only in Farsi. However, the company was encouraged to present its project to NIRT centers in provincial capitals, where regional languages such as Azeri and Kurdish were used in broadcasting.

Lastly, a French company proposed making ERTI’s television programs interactive. While ERTI managers and technical staff were curious about the technology behind this idea, the French delegation surprisingly showed up with a cardboard tabletop board game as their “interactive” solution! They were offered some tea for their trouble, and were informed that ERTI was launching a new research initiative to make live broadcasts interactive between teachers and students once telecommunication satellite access was available.

Selecting and Adopting Technologies

NIRT leaders chose the University Consortium for Instructional Development and Technology (UCITD) to train ERTI staff due to its faculty’s pioneering research in educational technology and their ability to transfer this research into engaging professional workshops (see Chapter Five). NIRT also selected Stanford University for its long-term planning support, given Stanford’s excellent reputation in studying the effectiveness of educational television (see Chapter Ten). Furthermore, Stanford housed cutting-edge laboratories for telecommunication research, making it a key partner in NIRT’s expansion of telecommunication capacity through deploying a communication satellite. Furthermore, Harvard University, with its extensive experience in educational facility planning, was selected to assist NIRT in designing its future campus. Each of these institutions was a global leader in its respective field, offering technologies that aligned with ERTI’s goals and could be adapted to Iran’s cultural customs and social norms.

ERTI’s newly hired and trained educational technologists and producers quickly mastered the technologies provided by UCIDT. Once proficient, they implemented these technologies independently, without relying on foreign advisors (see Chapter Eight). As they gained experience in applying educational technology in Iranian schools, they refined their own workshop presentations and shared these insights with UCIDT faculty. This exchange of knowledge demonstrated that the flow of information between ERTI and UCIDT was not one-sided. UCITD faculty also benefited from the lessons learned by their Iranian trainees, applying these insights to educational technology transfer in other developing countries. This was evident to the author when, in the early 1980s, a group of students from Indonesia arrived at Syracuse University to learn about educational technology and transfer that knowledge back to their home country.

In the meantime, ERTI’s Planning Unit collaborated with experts from Stanford University to establish the organization’s long-term goals. These objectives included:

• Defining ERTI’s national role,
• Identifying program areas for both its broadcast services and in-person training, and
• Acquiring a state-of-the-art telecommunication satellite to expand its broadcast services.

Additionally, ERTI’s existing building, constructed in the 1950s for a local television station, was insufficient to support its future national-scale operations. To address this, ERTI enlisted architectural planners from Harvard University, who had decades of experience designing campuses for complex organizations, to assist in planning and constructing a new headquarters.

Implementing Transfer of Technology Projects

Meticulous attention was given to managing these projects after they were screened and tailored for adaptation, implementation, and evaluation. Training educational technologists, long-term planning for ERTI, and designing the future national headquarters were complex, multidimensional initiatives that carried significant risks if mismanaged. ERTI leadership and staff closely monitored the progress of these projects, ensuring that managers from donor organizations met their commitments and fulfilled their responsibilities on time. They played an active role in guaranteeing the projects adhered to the terms outlined in the agreements between NIRT/ERTI and these donor organizations.

Mr. Rahmanzadeh took the lead in daily monitoring of the American personnel, ensuring they adhered to their contractual obligations. A few months into implementing the UCIDT training project, he informed this author that it was falling behind schedule. His investigation revealed that the delays were due to the resident American project manager in Tehran, appointed by UCIDT, failing to perform his duties effectively. ERTI leadership approached Dr. William Allen from the University of Southern California, who oversaw the UCIDT project in both Iran and the United States, to address the issue. During a meeting in Tehran, it quickly became clear that Dr. Allen was also dissatisfied with the project’s slow progress. By mutual agreement, they decided to replace the resident manager. This change proved to be extremely beneficial. Dr. Delayn Hudspeth from Syracuse University took over management of the training project in Tehran and promptly brought it back on track. His efforts earned the admiration of his UCIDT colleagues and the respect of ERTI staff and trainees alike.

ERTI managers also realized that the principal investigators appointed by Stanford University had made no effort to engage with ERTI leadership and showed little interest in involving them in the long-term planning process. Repeated attempts by this author to contact them were ignored, a lack of communication and attention deemed unacceptable by the NIRT leadership. During a visit to Stanford University, this author raised these concerns with Dr. Lyle M. Nelson, then Chair of the Department of Communication. He immediately recognized the issue and took responsibility for managing the remainder of the project.

As a result, the original principal investigators were replaced with a new team whose members were much more responsive to ERTI’s needs. The new team prepared a 69-page final report, outlining ERTI’s future vision and providing specific, actionable recommendations for long-term activities. Additionally, Dr. Nelson’s team created a subsequent document, Statement of Purpose for Educational Radio and Television of Iran, which contained detailed plans that complemented the university’s final report and proved instrumental in charting a long-term future for ERTI (Cooney, Nelson, & Starlin, 1978) (See Chapter Ten).

Assessment of the implementation of UCIDT and Stanford University projects went beyond evaluating their programmatic progress; it also involved meticulous scrutiny of every dollar spent. Mr. Kaveh Dejkam, ERTI’s Accounting Unit manager, closely monitored the financial progress of these projects. With the support of the Planning Unit, he only authorized payments to the contractors when he was satisfied that they had met their contractual obligations. In several instances, payments to Stanford University were withheld until their responsibilities were fulfilled. Additionally, Mr. Dejkam supervised the disbursement of per diems to the American consultants in Tehran with utmost care.

His meticulous accounting practices, however, revealed a stark pay disparity between ERTI personnel and their American counterparts, despite comparable education and experience. ERTI’s American consultants were paid the normal salaries they earned in the United States, which were significantly higher than the compensation of similarly qualified Iranians. Mr. Rahmanzadeh and this author had to explain this disparity to the Accounting Unit staff and others who frequently raised concerns. The difference reflected the unequal economic conditions between the United States and Iran at the time, which made it necessary for ERTI to hire foreign advisors in a large-scale effort to enhance Iran’s educational and training services.

Nevertheless, this issue became a point of political contention in the late 1970s. As general dissatisfaction grew and Iran entered a period of increasing instability, the focus of the discussion shifted from the high salaries of the foreign advisors to their very presence in ERTI. Despite this, ERTI succeeded in transferring valuable technologies and advancing its goals in a relatively short period, thanks to a continuous commitment to both short-term and long-term planning—a subject that will be discussed in the next chapter.