Lessons Learned

Introduction

Social reforms and economic development plans implemented in earnest during the 1960s and 1970s continued to advance throughout these decades, despite the vehement opposition of the left and the violent hostility of the radical clergy. Industry, agriculture, transportation, communication, and education experienced significant growth and reform, albeit at varying speeds and with uneven results.

During this period, NIRT leaders and unit managers were deeply concerned about the changing structure of the economy and society. These concerns, discussed extensively in numerous long meetings attended by this author, led Mr. Ghotbi to turn to Iran Communications and Development Institute (ICDI) and its leader Dr. Majid Tehranian (1937–2012), an alumnus of Dartmouth University. The task that Mr. Ghotbi referred to ICDI was to better understand the future role of NIRT in light of the profound social and economic transformations underway, as well as the growing resistance from the clergy and the left. To achieve this goal, Dr. Tehranian assembled a group of young scholars who organized two symposia in 1975. These conferences, aimed at exploring the future, were called ayanedeh negari in Farsi, or Foresight in English. Participants focused on the role of communication media in developing societies and the specific responsibilities of NIRT.

The first symposium included NIRT’s leadership, its network and production managers, producers, and other key personnel. The second symposium expanded to include high-profile experts in communication and development from prominent institutions of higher education, think tanks, consulting firms, and cultural organizations in Iran, as well as from other Asian countries, Europe, and the United States. Additionally, speakers and attendees at both symposia participated in a Delphi study, a social science method that aggregates qualitative data from experts to forecast the future of a particular phenomenon. This author actively participated in both conferences and their associated Delphi studies.

Outcomes of the Symposia and the Delphi Studies

The proceedings of the symposia and the results of the Delphi studies were initially released by ICDI in Tehran in 1977 as a monograph. They were later published as a book by the international publisher Routledge in 2016 (Tehranian, 2016). In the book’s introductory chapter, Dr. Tehranian provided a commentary summarizing the symposia discussions, the Delphi study results, and his own insights. He noted the following:

1. In the 1970s, two historic developments occurred simultaneously within a single decade: The rise of both industrial and post-industrial ways of life in Iran.
2. These significant social transformations unfolded among hundreds of thousands of industrial workers and a smaller group of educated elite, while millions of Iranians continued to live simple agrarian lives in pre-industrial villages.
3. By contrast, in the West, the transition from an agricultural society to industrial and post-industrial societies occurred sequentially over several centuries.

Dr. Tehranian further remarked that the speed and intensity of these social transformations within a decade were jarring for many Iranians. The youth, who constituted half of the population and were in various stages of forming their social and personal identities, were particularly affected. Many, especially those who lived in urban areas, struggled to reconcile the rapid changes with their traditional way of life, leading to feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement.

Compounding these challenges was the “large-scale transfer of modern science and technology” from abroad. Traditional segments of society, the religious-minded, and many among the Marxist elite and their young followers viewed these imported sciences and technologies as alien to their culture. They felt that the new ideas derived from them were overpowering their customary culture and way of life.

Dr. Tehranian emphasized that by the late 1970s, the speed and intensity of technology transfer from abroad exceeded the capacity of established political institutions to rationalize and normalize these changes. This, in turn, fostered a sense of “nationalism and solidarity against foreign domination.” Eventually, this growing discontent gave rise to “revolutionary movements…to confront imposition of a foreign way of life” (Tehranian, 2016, pp. 23–24).

In his commentary, Dr. Tehranian also questioned the judgment of some Iranian reformers and globally renowned economists and development experts regarding the role of religion in developing societies. Prominent figures, such as the politically influential American economist Walt Rostow (1960), assumed an inverse relationship between economic development and the prevalence of religion in such societies. In other words, they postulated that as modern economies grew, adherence to religious beliefs would decline. Dr. Tehranian challenged this assumption, arguing that increased economic development did not necessarily result in increased secularization. He posited that under conditions of rapid development, “The function of religion will surely change, but the total denial of man’s spiritual needs would lead to psychological alienation and social disintegration” (p. 24).

Dr. Tehranian’s conclusions encapsulated the sentiments of NIRT leaders and its key personnel. While their views were not identical, they generally agreed that rapid social and economic change in Iran was essential to transition the country away from its traditional feudal regime, which had kept it stagnant for centuries. However, they also shared varying degrees of concern that a society unable to retain some of its key traditional cultural traits risked losing its cohesiveness. They expressed trepidation that during a time of rapid change, as traditional cultural traits came under scrutiny, political leaders might struggle to address social ills such as alienation effectively. Without the ability to help people preserve their personal and cultural identity, these leaders would fail to integrate millions of disenfranchised individuals into the mainstream of political and economic life—particularly those seeking employment without the requisite skills. Furthermore, the inability of political institutions to absorb the shocks of transformation from a feudal society to a new social order, which demanded personal competence from its members, would empower the radical clergy and leftist opposition.

Impact on ERTI

NIRT was not an isolated entity and was directly influenced by the social changes occurring in the mid-1970s. During this period, rising revolutionary sentiments among politically active segments of society profoundly impacted the staff at NIRT. Two years after the release of the results from the Foresight conferences and related Delphi studies in 1978, a significant number of staff members went on strike. Among the early strikers were several key members of ERTI. Their discontent eventually spread to many colleagues, culminating in the end of decades of work utilizing educational television and radio to support national development plans by 1979.

The lessons learned during these decades are presented below in detail and remain relevant for future efforts to use media in reinstituting reforms and development projects when Iranians are able to resume normal economic and social life. In the assessment of Amir Taheri (2023), the veteran international journalist, the conduct of the Islamic Republic since its inception in 1979 has not resembled that of a normal nation-state but has remained revolutionary in nature. Those in charge have prioritized their elusive, millenarian revolutionary aims over improving the economic and social conditions of Iranians. By definition, these aims possess an apocalyptic end, as delineated by David Cook (2003) in his study. The goals of the Islamic Republic are not framed around tangible or measurable achievements, such as economic growth or the provision of personal, social, and political freedoms. Instead, they center on revolutionary ideals, the most significant being the “eradication of Israel from the face of the earth” and the complete defeat of the “Great Satan,” or the United States. Consequently, the devaluation of Iranian currency—from 70 Rial per US dollar in 1979 to 62,000 Rial per dollar in 2024—is of little concern to the regime (Radio Farda, 2024). Over the past four and a half decades, this dramatic and steady decline in the national currency’s value has not altered any domestic or foreign policies responsible for this economic collapse.

It is difficult to predict when Iranians will be able to resume a normal life and renew their pursuit of freedom and prosperity. What is certain, however, is that when they do resume their social and economic development, information and communication technologies, human resource development techniques, and teaching and learning methods will differ significantly from those presented in this book. Nonetheless, fundamental issues—such as the lengthy incubation period required for research-based and data-driven development efforts to bear fruit—will remain unchanged.

Primary Lessons

1. A prolonged incubation period was essential for reform and development projects to yield results.

Pioneers like Dr. Mahmoodi, who utilized broadcasting to provide direct instruction to school-age children and adults in universities, laid the foundation for their work in the 1960s and 1970s. However, the significant expansion of these efforts in the mid-1970s demonstrated that establishing a research-based and data-driven organization capable of long-term self-sustainability required an extended incubation period. By the late 1970s, it became evident that ERTI personnel would need at least two or three more decades of professional practice to transition into an era of sustained growth extending into the 21st century and beyond. The revolutionary events of 1978, however, disrupted this incubation period, prematurely ending the evolutionary maturation of ERTI. This halted the carefully cultivated environment that Mr. Ghotbi and Dr. Mahmoodi had provided for ERTI staff to refine their expertise. In contrast, similar institutions, particularly in the United States, benefited from uninterrupted decades of development, allowing them to mature and achieve effectiveness over time.

Moreover, the leadership of ERTI recognized that even in the 1960s and 1970s, adopting technological methods to improve educational practices and adapt them to Iranian cultural norms was neither smooth nor linear. Studies conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s reinforced this understanding, showing that the transfer of educational technology was an iterative, non-linear process characterized by periods of ebb and flow due to its experimental nature.

Hoffmann (1985) further analyzed the “anatomy” of this reinvention, outlining three stages:

• Searching for alternative technologies and selecting one.
• Adapting the selected technology to the organization’s needs.
• Modifying and reinventing the technology—and potentially developing entirely new technologies—after mastering the original one (p. 74).

Although the two studies mentioned above were published after the demise of ERTI and were not based on direct observations of the organization, they reflected the realities of technology transfer during ERTI’s operational years. In retrospect, the three stages of reinvention outlined in those studies were evident at ERTI as well. Leaders at NIRT and ERTI carefully selected the systems approach to educational problem-solving, exemplified by offering Instructional Development Institute (IDI) workshops.

While the core concept of systems in IDI was indigenous to Iran, its media materials required adaptation to Iranian cultural norms and social mores. As a process technology, IDI required workshop participants to create their own instructional materials and activities, grounded in systems theory principles. This adaptability made IDI particularly suitable for localization. To adapt IDI’s materials, trainees first translated its core textual content into Farsi. They then modified its media materials, role-playing activities, and simulation procedures to align with Iranian cultural practices, effectively creating a localized version of IDI—referred to as IIDI.

Educational technologists introduced IIDI workshops to teachers and school principals, collecting feedback that further refined the workshop materials. Unfortunately, this process of offering workshops and revising their core materials ceased in 1978, only two years after the workshops were introduced to a small group of teachers and administrators in Tehran, and a few other cities. Had this effort continued, it is likely that new iterations of the workshop would have emerged—more effective, efficient, and distinctly Iranian in style.

Moreover, ERTI staff would have had the opportunity to fully implement ERTI’s model of technology transfer (see Chapter 9). This would have included sharing their experience in transforming IDI into IIDI with members of UCIDT and other professionals at international conferences. Such collaboration would have demonstrated that technology transfer is not a one-way process but a reciprocal exchange of ideas, fostering innovation and mutual learning.

Other matters in building a professional organization also required decades of effort beyond the initial pioneering period in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1978, ERTI consultants from Stanford University were in their 6th year of developing and implementing a 20-year plan for the future of the organization However, this short period was insufficient to realize the long-term goals of ERTI. NIRT and ERTI leaders expected that results of this multifaceted planning process would begin to materialize from1992 onward.

Adequate incubation time was also a significant concern for ERTI unit managers. For instance, this author held daily discussions with Mr. Azadan, ERTI’s Production Unit Manager, about ways to accelerate the adoption of the systems approach in producing radio and television programs. His consistent response emphasized that producers required a substantial period to learn and integrate the various aspects of the systems approach into their production practices. He often reiterated, “This learning process cannot take place overnight.”

Nevertheless, a persistent question among ERTI planners, including this author, and the American advisors was whether it might be possible to leapfrog stages of technology transfer through intensive staff training. However, as the training project progressed, it became evident that leapfrogging into the future was not feasible for all staff members.

A major issue was that ERTI staff members had diverse educational backgrounds, leading to varied responses to their on-the-job training program. In many cases, their academic degrees were not directly relevant to their assigned positions, requiring special mentoring to master the systems approach for producing radio and television programs. Similarly, the administrative and support staff needed to learn the principles of systems management. Retraining administrators to adopt a systems approach also required individual mentoring and training, as their varied educational backgrounds influenced their understanding of their roles during a time of rapid change.

Additionally, the mixed proficiency in English among staff members posed a challenge. Not all could equally benefit from the guidance of the American advisors. Paradoxically, leapfrogging—if achievable—was more likely among the more educated staff. Members of the planning, research, and evaluation units with graduate degrees from English-speaking universities engaged easily with their UCIDT advisors and quickly absorbed their guidance. Conversely, staff members with limited English proficiency and lower educational attainment were less inclined to approach the UCIDT instructors and struggled to benefit fully from their expertise.

Employees of the organizations that ERTI served were at varying levels of competency and efficiency as well. Furthermore, each organization was at a different stage of development and maturity. As a result, not all of them could equally benefit from ERTI’s services. Professors and staff at Pahlavi University in Shiraz, for example, were more agile compared to the general managers of the MOE, who managed a sprawling bureaucracy in Tehran and other provinces.

Consequently, the professors and staff of Pahlavi University successfully collaborated with the NIRT Fars Province staff to provide learning services to a group of non-traditional students via radio and television in Fars Province in a relatively short time. They also skillfully responded to a request from NIRT’s Fars center to conduct a summative evaluation of ERTI’s programs for Guidance Cycle students—the first such evaluation in the country.

In contrast, in Tehran and other provincial centers, ERTI had to allocate considerable resources and invest years of preparation and training to address the MOE’s inability to train teachers in the use of educational television in schools. While the collaboration between the Fars Center and Pahlavi University advanced rapidly, the relationship with the MOE headquarters in Tehran and other provinces progressed at a snail’s pace. It was obvious to this author that the MOE’s general managers, along with hundreds of thousands of teachers and administrators, required a lengthy and drawn-out development period to adopt the innovations ERTI staff were introducing.

2. Financial resources were necessary but not sufficient for skill development among the staff.

In 1975, ERTI experienced a sudden increase in financial resources. Iran had been a poor country for much of the 20th century, but by the mid-1970s, the government had sufficient funds to finance its development plan. At that time, it seemed to this author that ERTI had more than adequate financial resources to achieve its objective of supporting the MOE and other educational institutions. However, this optimism was short-lived. During a high-level NIRT planning session in Isfahan in the summer of 1975, ERTI’s budget for the following year was dramatically increased. Yet it soon became apparent that achieving ERTI’s goals primarily depended on the slow and deliberate process of skill development among its employees, not merely on the availability of additional financial resources. Financial resources alone could not accelerate the methodical process of staff training or rapidly enhance their lived experience.

Nonetheless, the increased funding allowed ERTI to hire more employees, some of whom had already attained high educational achievements before joining the organization, although not all of them possessed the specific skills immediately useful to ERTI. The additional resources also enabled the purchase of more hardware and software and the expansion of physical facilities for training and skill development. Despite these advancements, it was not possible to maximize the use of the newly acquired facilities, such as the behavioral science laboratory. Optimal utilization of these resources required years of accumulated experience and practice.

With the exponential growth of research in the field of educational technology worldwide, time was also needed to review new research findings and integrate them into the training of new employees and the retraining of existing staff. As such, there was always a lag between the emergence of new knowledge about educational communication and technology and its practical application. In the daily operations of ERTI, technology was embodied in the skill and experience of its staff, rather than solely in the quantity and quality of hardware, software systems, and physical facilities that additional funding could procure. These resources were essential for program production, distribution, and utilization. However, their true value depended on the expertise of those who used them effectively to produce higher-quality radio and television programs and conduct more impactful in-person training workshops.

3. Conceptual differences about the meaning of technology was the primary impediment to assisting the MOE.

Introducing the concept of technology as human skills to client organizations, such as the MOE, was the main conceptual challenge for ERTI. Technology referred to proficient staff members and effective teachers and administrators in schools—where technology and technologists were considered indivisible. In contrast, policymakers in the MOE viewed technology as manufactured equipment and physical facilities. As a result, high-level MOE administrators perceived ERTI’s role as limited to installing television sets and other hardware in schools, as well as maintaining them. Meanwhile, ERTI’s detractors, which included most of the clergy, their traditional supporters, and so-called intellectual backers—particularly those aligned with Marxism—viewed technology as a foreign imposition. In their perspective, foreign powers used technology to exploit Iran, depriving its people of their wealth and eroding their personal and social identity.

4. Change was the only constant.

While ERTI was struggling to resolve this key conceptual issue, another conundrum emerged in the 1970s. Social scientists began to question the efficacy of large, centralized technology-based organizations in assisting disenfranchised populations. Particularly in developing countries, they argued that more organic and smaller-scale solutions were often more effective. Led by E. F. Schumacher (1973), the “small is beautiful” movement posited that technological solutions often had secondary consequences more detrimental to society than the problems they aimed to solve. A glaring example was the increasing pollution caused by industrial manufacturing powered by fossil fuels. While factories boosted domestic production in developing countries, raised the incomes of thousands of workers, and made goods more affordable for low-income populations, they also polluted the environment through their byproducts.

Focusing on developing countries, Schumacher questioned industrialization as a true indicator of economic progress. He argued: “Development does not start with goods; it starts with people and their education, organization, and discipline” (p. 168). He criticized the formation of large corporate entities promoting industrialization and the rapid growth of sprawling metropolitan areas that supported them. Schumacher was particularly concerned with financial entities like the World Bank, which prioritized funding large, centralized organizations while restricting access to capital for small or micro businesses. He doubted that a market economy oriented toward large-scale government projects or big businesses benefited the people of developing countries.

These ideas resonated with the educated elite of developing countries, including Iranians. Attendees at Foresight conferences—many of whom taught at prominent European and American universities or were recent graduates—echoed Schumacher’s concerns about the effectiveness of large technological organizations to solve the problems that kept Iranians less economically fortunate and less socially privileged. This perspective required a major reevaluation of ERTI’s primary objectives in supporting the MOE’s large and unwieldy centralized bureaucracy. It also necessitated a reassessment of ERTI’s own plans for growth and development as a centralized national organization.

5. A national narrative to support economic development projects and social reform programs required more cultivation before it could effectively compete with radical Islamism and revolutionary Marxism-Maoism.

In the mid-1970s, Schumacher was not the only social scientist and commentator to question the application of science and technology as a means to advance developing countries toward a better economic and social future.[1] Dr. Shariati, Dr. Naraghi, and Mr. Al-Ahmad were among the leading Iranian intellectuals who criticized what they saw as the inadequacy of Western technology to address the needs of Iranian society (see Chapter Three). Instead, they turned to homegrown solutions, including the original teachings of Islam, as a path to lift Iranians out of poverty and social stagnation.

Even those aligned with Marxism saw no contradiction between their Western-originated ideology and the dogmatic theology of the radical clergy, while proponents of Maoism framed his version of Marxism as Eastern. Paradoxically, despite their claims of progressivism, these leftists became ardent supporters of the regressive and reactionary clergy. Like the clergy, they sought to dismantle the constitutional parliamentary government, arguing that their revolution aimed to liberate Iran’s disenfranchised people from the oppression of Western colonialists and imperialists. They urged the people to reject the economic development plans and social reforms imposed by the Western-oriented government and to follow their religious leaders for salvation.[2]

At this decisive moment, a comprehensive national narrative was necessary to revive the distinctive features of Iranian culture and chart a unique course for the country’s future development. This narrative needed to draw upon Iran’s own ethos, mythology, history, literature, science, cosmology, and religious beliefs. Additionally, it was meant to provide a framework for people to critically evaluate the rising influence of Islamic radicalism, the increasing sway of Marxism and Maoism, and the growing impact of science and technology on their lives.

However, by the late 1970s, an independent, comprehensive, and compelling account of Iranian civilization had yet to be fully articulated and widely publicized, despite academic efforts dating back to the 1930s. In the 1940s Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946) symbolized the rebirth of the Iranian cultural and its historical identity as distinct from the Arab religion of Islam before he was assassinated by a radical clergy. Nonetheless, reviving the unique identity of Iranians based on their pre-Islamic culture gradually expanded and gained momentum through the 1960s and 1970s. While describing the contributions of the many historians, literary scholars, archaeologists, sociologists, writers, poets, and artists who worked to reconnect Iranians with their cultural past is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that significant progress was made during this period.

Building on explorations initiated during the Reza Shah era, researchers and scholars uncovered and documented an impressive body of evidence highlighting a rich and unique culture that extended from the prehistoric mythical age to contemporary times. This evidence encompassed a wide range of historical, cultural, architectural, scientific, and literary artifacts.[3] However, the presentation of this glorious past in formal publications and mass media remained incomplete. It lacked a direct connection to the country’s current affairs and failed to articulate a vision for a future where financially independent Iranians could guide the nation toward a sustainable democracy. Perhaps more importantly, it failed to sufficiently emphasize that to become financially independent, Iranians needed to become educated, competent, and self-reliant. In the absence of a complete and comprehensive national narrative, radical Islamists, Marxists, and Maoists proposed a quick fix to the country’s problems: staging a revolution. Their revolutionary stance was rooted in two fundamentally different discourses—one spiritual and the other materialistic. However, both discourses had benefited from centuries of development and articulation. Radical Islamism and Marxism had well-established bodies of literature that had been refined over more than two centuries and were widely recognized across the world. In contrast, efforts to develop an independent Iranian narrative were only a few decades old, leaving it relatively underdeveloped in comparison.

In an odd way, the Iran of the 1970s saw Islamists, Marxists, and Maoists complementing each other. Together, they opposed pragmatic economic development projects, lamented land reform, bemoaned improvements in education, mourned the integration of women into civil society, cursed the alleged adoption of Western lifestyles, bewailed the societal impact of technology, and grieved the purported imposition of neo-colonialism and imperialism on Iran. Furthermore, Islamists, with the support of leftist groups, led a regressive revolutionary movement aimed at uprooting the constitutional parliamentary order and replacing it with a hierocracy. Misleadingly, they promised instant democracy and immediate equitable wealth distribution. However, their grand promises lacked a clear strategy or concrete plans for implementation.

In the days and weeks leading up to the revolution, this author engaged in numerous conversations with ERTI staff members drawn to radical Islamist or ultra-leftist organizations. In formal meetings and casual exchanges. When I asked how the future government would differ from the existing one, they failed to provide a convincing, detailed answer. They could not present a compelling argument that the country would be in a better state than its current condition. Nor did they articulate a specific development plan, whether verbally or in their literature. Their often impatient and terse response could be summarized in one sentence: “When the Shah is gone, everything will fall into place.”

These former colleagues were swept up in the revolutionary fervor of the time. Like thousands of others, they suspended personal judgment and placed their faith in a mindless collective movement that dominated major cities with street demonstrations. From this author’s perspective, these demonstrators unwittingly supported a revolution instigated by a privileged class against the poor and disenfranchised. This privileged class included the clergy, revered by the wealthy landowners, who kept millions of Iranians in serfdom; and affluent bazar merchants, who controlled domestic and foreign trade. With the support of influential figures among the educated elite and the cognoscenti in the expanding middle class, they succeeded in derailing and halting hundreds of development projects, such as ERTI, along with several fundamental social reform programs.

More than four decades have passed since the revolution led by Islamists, Marxists, Maoists, and the cultural elite. During this time, these groups have established a hierocracy that has:

1. Sternly curtailed basic social freedoms for most of the population,
2. Equitably distributed economic misery among the people,
3. Severely eroded the moral fabric of society, and
4. Corrupted essential social relations required for the effective management of a prosperous and free nation.