Chapter Summaries
Preface
Presents the historical time frame of the book and how its contents reflect the zeitgeist of the time. Explains how the book was written based on the documents and information that was generated and available during the operation of Educational Radio and Television of Iran (ERTI) in the 1960s and 1970s. Describes why this author did not refer to many studies that have been conducted and published about Iran since the demise of ERTI in 1978. Clarifies why only recent publications that reflected the spirit of the 1960s and 1970s were used in writing the book.
Chapter 1: Television in Iran: A Brief Overview
Presents a brief overview of the establishment of television broadcasting in Iran. Explains the historical evolution of television broadcasting from two commercial local stations in the cities of Tehran and Abadan to a government owned and operated national network that covered most of the population of the country with a massive microwave transmission network. Explores the centrality of Farsi literary heritage of Iran in defining the culture of Iranians and how preserving and promoting this literary heritage impacted culture and arts in general and radio and television programing policies in particular. Describes the introduction of social and economic reforms in Iran by the government in the 1960s and 1970s and explains how these reforms programs galvanized opposition to government and defined the political conditions in which radio and television broadcasters operated.
Chapter 2: Educational Television in Iran
Describes the historical condition for broadcasting educational television programs first in the commercial television station in Tehran, and then on the national network of the National Iranian Radio Television (NIRT) that was owned and operated by the government. Explains the parallel effort of the Ministry of Education (MOE) to broadcast educational television programs independently. Presents the expansion of ERTI from a unit of NIRT with 50 professionals in 1973 to a unit consisting of 500 professionals in 1978.
Chapter 3: Reorganizing ERTI
Introduces the men and women who managed ERTI and the role they played in its reorganization along nine primary functions: administration, coordination, planning, development, production, dissemination, utilization, evaluation, and research. Each of these functions are fully explained. Presents the rationale for adopting systems philosophy, methodology, and technology for managing ERTI.
Chapter 4: Adopting Educational Technology
Introduces the conceptual foundations of the field of educational technology. Describes the role of systems philosophy, methodology and technology as conceptual foundations of the field of educational technology. Explains how Iranian sages and mathematicians laid the groundwork for systems philosophy and its mathematical methodology in the Middle Ages. Explains the role of educational technology to reform legacy educational systems. Explicates the role of the University Consortium for Instructional Development (UCITD) to introduce reform in elementary, middle, and secondary schools through presenting Instructional Development Institute (IDI) workshops in the United States. Explains how political and religious opposition to the government vehemently objected to the adoption of educational technology by ERTI as an alien idea, although its original concepts and methods were rooted in the philosophical and scientific legacy of Iran.
Chapter 5: Training Educational Technologists
Details the primary role of faculty and instructional designers from Syracuse University as well as five other institutions of higher education in training educational technologists for ERTI in Tehran, as well as in Bloomington, Indiana (Indiana University), and Tallahassee, Florida (Florida State University). Explains how the train-the-trainer nature of the program was designed to create a multiplier effect in the MOE to introduce reform in the antiquated method of teaching and learning in schools that were managed by the MOE. Clarifies why even in these schools that were run by the government, the primary mode of instruction had its roots in the religious mode of literally dictating to students as teaching.
Chapter 6: Pedagogical Barriers
Explores the pedagogical differences between ERTI and the MOE. This discord stemmed from ERTI’s method of teaching and learning to foster analytical thinking among students instead of the archaic recite and recall form of teaching and learning that was prevalent in schools that were managed by the MOE. Explains the role of Islamic schools (maktabs and madrasahs) in institutionalizing rote memorization as the only form of learning. Clarifies the philosophical basis of the opposition of clergy to introducing educational reform in Iran.
Chapter 7: Bridging the Pedagogical Gap Between ERTI and the MOE
Presents steps that ERTI and the MOE leaders took to bridge their pedagogical gap. Explains the outstanding and tireless efforts of ERTI producers to create and present effective educational television programs to students throughout the country. Explains how ERTI evaluated the effectiveness of its programs by evaluating learners on a routine basis.
Chapter 8: Consolidating Gains
Describes how ERTI consolidated its gains in offering educational technology services beyond the MOE to several other universities and government institutions. Presents why UNESCO recognized ERTI as a regional resource center. Describes the establishment of learning resource centers in several cities in Iran. Presents the expansion of broadcasting services to Pahlavi University in Shiraz, presents the collaboration with the university to conduct a summative evaluation of educational broadcasts, presents the use of programmed instruction to first graders for learning how to read Farsi.
Chapter 9: Transfer of Knowledge and Technology to ERTI
Explains the role of transfer of technology from advanced countries of the world in elevating ERTI to become a world class organization. Presents the rationale for developing countries to rely on research and development in advanced countries at least at the initial stage of their development before they become self-sufficient in generating new knowledge. Describes a day at Beijing University where a group of NIRT officials, including the author, learned how the People’s Republic of China planned to transfer technology from The United States and European countries despite its deep ideological differences with them. Frames the process of transfer of technology from the West to Iran during the Cold War. Describes the origins of the Cold War in Iran. Explains the objection of political and religious opposition groups to the transfer of technology to Iran in terms of dependency theory. Describes the model of ERTI for the transfer of technology that negated the dependency theory.
Chapter 10: Short-Term and Long-Term Planning
Explains the use of computer simulation modeling for short-term planning in ERTI. Describes the long-term plan for the expansion of ERTI in the 1980s and beyond that was developed by Stanford University. Details the plan for building a new campus for ERTI in Mazandaran that was developed by Harvard University.
Chapter 11: Demise of ERTI
Explains the sudden change in the political condition of Iran that led to the demise of ERTI in 1978. Describes the role of reactionary clergy, traditional bazaar merchants, feudal landowners, and radical violent Marxist-Maoist revolutionary groups in opposing and ultimately stopping development programs in Iran in 1978.
Chapter 12: Lessons Learned
Describes the lessons that the author learned in managing ERTI from 1973 to 1978. These were:
- A very long incubation time was required for reform and development projects to show results.
- Leapfrogging from conditions of underdevelopment to development was not an option for all staff members of ERTI.
- Adequate financial resources were necessary but not sufficient for skill development among the staff of ERTI.
- Technology was synonymous with human skills, not hardware and software.
- Change was the only constant!
- A national narrative to support government reforms required years of cultivation before it could compete with Marxism and radical Islamism.